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H.: The Law of Subjacent Support and the West Virginia Rule
EDITORIAL NOTES

wrongful? Presumably because it is unconstitutional, since legislatures may, except as bound by constitutional limitations, define
both "rights" and "wrongs." But its "wrongfulness" is suggested as a reason for its unconstitutionality. Are the two made synonymous by the Fourteenth Amendment ?
To those who have thought that, in recent years, the Supreme
Court of the United States has, by a too-liberal definition of the
term "police power," allowed to the states such freedom of action
that the general constitutional guarantees had become illusory, the
decision in the Truax Case will indicate a marked reversal of policy
on the part of that court. The further application of that policy
to the cases will be watched with interest by the profession.
-J. W. M.

STUDENT NOTES AND RECENT CASES
THE LAW OF SUBJACENT SUPPORT AND THE WEST VIRGINIA RULE.

-By a grant of the minerals and reservation of the land or by a
sale of the land and a reservation of the minerals, two estates are
created, each having certain rights and duties in reference to the
other. The most important duty and the one which gives rise to
legal complications is that which the subservient estate owes the
upper. There is imposed upon the mineral estate the servitude of
supporting the surface in its natural form. The general rule established by the common law and by American and English decisions is that it is incumbent upon the grantee of coal to leave a
sufficient amount thereof to prevent the subsidence of the surface,
unless waived by express words or clear implication.1 In other
words it resolves ftself into the maxim of so using your own as not
to interfere with others. At common law the right of subjacent
support is fundamental, existing as an easement or servitude from
which the servient estate could not be relieved except by apt words
or necessary implication.2 As the right was absolute, the courts
I Lennox Coal Co. v. Duncan Spangler Coal Company, 265 Pa. 572, 109 Atl. 282
(1920) ; Godfrey v. Weyanoke Coal Co., 82 W. Va. 665, 97 S. E. 186 (1918) ;
Stonegap Colliery Co. -v. Hamilton, 119 Va. 271, 89 S. E. 305 (1916) ; Rowbotham v.
Wilson, 30 L. J. Q. B. 54, 17 Eng. Rul. Cas. 647 (1860) ; Lore v. Bell, 9 App. Cas. 298,
17 Eng. Rul. Cas. 657 (1884) ; Western Indiana Coal Co. v. Brown, 36 Ind. App. 44,
74 N. E. 1027 (1905)
Collins v. Gleason Coal Co., 140 Iowa 114, 115 N. W. 497,
118 N. W. 36 (1908) ; Hooper v. Dora Coal Mining Co., 95 Ala. 235, 10 So. 652
(18923 ; Williams v. Hay, 120 Pa. 485, 6 Am. St. Rep. 379 (1888) ; Silver Springs
etc. Co. v. Van Ness, 45 Fla. 559, 34 So. 884 (1903) ; Hall v. Harvey Coal etc. Co.,
108 S. E. 491 (W. Va. 1921).
2 Paull v. Island Coal Co., 44 Ind. App. 218, 88 N. E. 959 (1909); Lennox v.
Duncan Coal Co., supra; Burgner iv. Humphrey, 41 Ohio St. 340 (1884); Berkley v.
Berwind White Coal Mining Co., 229 Pa. 417, 78 At. 1004 (1911).
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as a general rule have held that the deed of conveyance would not
'exclude the right of support unless there was an express waiver
or a clear intent on the part of the surface owner to absolve the
grantee of the minerals from any damages arising because of the
removal of the entire body of coal. 3 All jurisdictions recognize the
right of waiver, but the courts are jealous of the duty of keeping
the surface in an uninjured condition and will not recognize the
claim of the grantee of the coal to remove the whole of it, unless
there is a grant of all coal and a renunciation in express words or
4
by clear implication of any claim for surface damage.
The West Virginia court does not follow the salutary rule adopted in most jurisdictions but lays down the rule that a deed conveying "all" the coal with the right to mine and remove the same
defeats the claim of the surface owner to have the land left uninjured by subsidence. This doctrine, enunciated by the court in the
case of Griffin v. Fairmont Coal Co.,' is an anomaly in the law of
subjacent support. The decision has received adverse criticism in
other jurisdictions." The case of Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co.7
came up in the Circuit Court of Appeals upon a similar state of
facts. The court held that the Griffin Case established a rule of
property and was therefore binding on the federal court. The
question as to whether it was a rule of property was certified to the
Supreme Court, where the question was answered in the negative.8 The Circuit Court followed the ruling of the Griffin Case,
deeming it inexpedient to establish two rules for the same state upon

3

"A reservation of all minerals or of the right of mining must always respect
the surface rights of support. The surface is not to be destroyed without some
:additional authority." 2 DEVxmN, REAL ESTATE, § 979. "Whenever the minerals belong
to one person and the surface to another, the law presumes that the surface owner
'has a right to support unless the language of the instrument regulating their rights,
,or other evidence clearly shows the contrary.
In order to exclude the right of
support the language used must unequivocally convey that intention either by express
'words or necessary implication." Butterknowle Colliery Co. V. Bishop etc. Coal Co.,
[1906] A. C. 305, 20 Times L. R. 675. In accord: Gumbert v. Kilgore, 4 Sadler
84, 6 AtI. 771 (Pa. 1886) ; Nelson v. Hock, 14 Phila. 665; Mickle v. Douglass, 75 Ia.
78, 39 N. W. 198 (1888)
Burgner v. Humphreys, supra.
M In the following cases there was a grant of "all" coal, yet the court held that
the right of support was not extinguished. Piedmont etc. Coal Co. V. Kearney, 114
-Md. 496, 79 AtI. 1013 (1911) ; Harris v. Ryding, 5 A. & W. 60, 8 I J. Ex. 181
(1839) ; Nelson v. Hock, supra; Williams v. Gibson, 84 Ala. 228, 4 So. 350 (1888) ;
*Erickson v. Michigan Land etc. Co., 50 Mich. 604, 16 N. W. 161 (1883) ; Carlin v.
Chappell, 101 Pa. 348, 47 Am. St. Rep. 722 (1882).
In Scranton v. Phillips, 94 Pa. 15 (1880) and Graff Furnace Co. v. Scranton Coal Co.,
:244 Pa. 592, 91 AtI. 508 (1914), all the coal was removed and the right to support
was lost but the words of conveyance gave an exclusive right to remove all the coal
.and gave an unconditional release from any Injury that might result to the surface.
In accord: Rowbotham v. Wilson, supra.
59 W. Va. 480, 53 S. E. 24, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1115 (1905).
SW'alsh v. Kansas Fuel Co., 91 Ran. 310, 137 Pac. 941, 50 L. R. A. (N. S.) 686
(1914) ; Paull v. Island Coal Co., supra; Schloss-Sheffield Steel etc. Co. v. Sampson,
158 Ala. 590, 48 So. 493 (1909).
See also 18 GREEN BAG 370.
' 102 C. C. A. 457, 179 Fed. 191 (1910).
215 U. S. 349, 30 Sup. Ct. 140 '(1909).
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identical facts. In a recent Virginia case," the Griffin Case was
cited, but the court said:
"We could not follow either the reasoning or the ruling in
the ease for which ruling the court did not cite a well considered case as sustaining it. On the other hand the decided cases
to which we have adverted, both English and American and
the text books written by eminent law writers concur in holding that the right of subjacent support is not waived by the
sale of 'all' the coal with the right to mine and remove it."
The latter part of this statement is supported by abundant au0
thority.'
There seems to be a slight relaxation by the West Virginia court
on the doctrine of subjacent support. Recent cases affirm the general rule, but make no great departure from the established rule
as to what constitutes waiver. In Hall v. Harvey Coal & Coke
Co.", the deed stated that "We do bargain, sell, grant and hereby
convey the coal and all minerals in and upon the hereinafter described tract." The court held that such words do not evince the
waiver of the right of subjacent support. The court distinguished
the case from the Griffin Case, saying that in the latter the word
"all" modified the word coal, while in the late case "all" modified minerals. By differentiating the cases the court impliedly
clings to the doctrine of the Griffin Case. However, the case definitely affirms the general rule, but postpones to a later date the
declaration that the grant of "all coal" does not evince the extinguishment of the right of subjacent support.
-C. P. H.
JURIES-PREJUDICIAL CONDUCT-SEPARATION.-Indictment for a

felony. A verdict of guilty was rendered. It was urged that the
separation of one juror from the others to go home for his nightshirt was prejudicial conduct. Held, the affidavit of the juror cleared
all doubt as to his conduct. State v. Driver, 107 S. E. 189 (W. Va.
1921).
The common law rule in regard to the separation of a jury was
that separation per se annulled the verdict. McCaul's Case, 1 Va.
Cas. 271; Overbee's Case, 1 Rob. (Va.) 756. But the strictness of
this rule has been tempered with the progress of time. In civil
cases, now, the jury may separate during recesses and adjournStonegap Colliery Co. v. Hamilton, supra, note 1.
See supra, note 1.
22 See supra, note 1.
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